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Abstract 
 
     We present survey results regarding a series of hypotheses on industry structure, 
regulation and patent policy towards GM food crops, focussing on the stages of the 
industry that generate innovations and approved products for sale to the farming 
sector.  Licensing as a means of delegating litigation and regulatory costs comes out 
as one of the most consistent themes in our responses.  We link this practice to a two-
tiered industry structure, a weak relation between litigation threat and research 
trajectory, and a perception by our respondents that patents – as well as patent design 
-- are “one step removed” from their research decisions.                
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Introduction 
 
     Genetically Modified (“GM”) food represents a unique opportunity to trace a new 
technology from its inception. It thereby provides a rich example within which we can 
examine the management of a new technology, as well as public policy towards new 
technologies.  This paper presents a series of hypotheses regarding industry structure, 
regulation, and patent policy towards GM food crops.  We have designed and 
implemented a survey focussing on the innovations that contribute towards the 
production of new GM plant varieties to allow us to gather information on the 
plausibility of these hypotheses.  This paper summarises the support (or lack of 
support) we found for them in our responses.   
 
     While our sample size is small, a number of suggestive findings emerge.  First, we 
investigate the competitive structure of GM food.  The industry involves a long 
vertical chain, moving from innovations to approved crops, to cultivation, processing, 
distribution and finally retail.  We investigate the structure of the first two stages of 
this chain.  We find some support for our hypothesis that GM food is perceived, at 
these stages, as a separate industry from the traditional food sector.  This suggests that 
the relatively high concentration ratios measured GM food are reflective of the true 
concentration level of this industry.  Further, they are well over the levels that 
generally trigger antitrust scrutiny.  Second, for rapidly changing or new markets, it 
has been suggested that “innovation market” structure be evaluated as a prospective 
measure of product market structure.  We use the survey’s support for patents as a 
measure of market power to propose and evaluate weighted patent counts as an 
implementation of the innovation market concept.  We find that this implementation 
tends to undervalue patents that are very important in our market so that the 
prospective measure of market share tends to understate actual levels of 
concentration, quite drastically in the case of highly important patents.   
 
     As we move from patent portfolios to products that are actually approved for 
commercialisation, we expect to see higher concentration.  After all, this is a new 
industry and product approvals take time.  Indeed, we postulate that regulatory 
approval could have a concentrating influence on this industry by erecting a 
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significant and persistent entry barrier.  Our survey responses lend general support to 
this hypothesis.  In fact, entities owning patents in this area appear to use licensing to 
delegate regulatory costs.  We suggest that a two tier structure of this industry results, 
with “design” firms providing technology on license to larger “hub” firms that 
concentrate patents, obtain regulatory approval and manufacture.  More stringent GM 
regulations are likely to increase this concentration.  In fact, responses indicate that 
most of the entry barrier is not due to learning economies, as the regulatory burden is 
not reported to fall greatly as entities accumulate submissions.  This, in turn, indicates 
that the concentrating influence of regulation is likely to be a long term phenomenon 
in this field.     
 
     Third, we investigate whether patents actually elicit research in this area through 
their reward function as is, indeed, the presumption of most economic models of the 
patent system.  Patents and their associated revenues are not cited as the primary 
cause that the specific research into GM food has taken place in our sample, even for 
entities that continue to be active in this field.  Indeed, our respondents indicated that 
other incentives generated their research in this area.  On the face of it, this would 
suggest that strengthening patent protection would be unlikely to generate more 
research spending by the “reward” route.  However respondents also cite that, 
whatever the reason that was cited for the research to have taken place patents are 
revenue generators, indicating that patents do fulfil, somewhat, the function of raising 
the returns to research-based firms.  Additionally, our respondents indicate that 
patents do appear to be viewed as valuable "defensive" tools for raising the cost of 
imitation.  In this sense, the salient function of the patent system may be closer to 
creating incentives to disclose innovations in the form of patents than to directing 
research by creating a reward.  In fact, most patent systems have a dual function of 
providing a reward to elicit research and also providing an incentive to disclose 
innovations by creating property rights that protect innovations from imitation, 
although the latter function tends to be the less studied in the Economics literature.      
 
     Finally, we investigate the role of litigation in this industry, and in particular its 
substitutability with licensing.  We find that this substitution does, in fact, appear to 
be occurring.  We receive, however, mixed support for Lanjouw and Schankerman’s 
(2001) hypothesis that smaller entities may face an entry barrier of higher litigation 
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costs than larger firms that have inventories of “spare” technologies that can be traded 
in order to stave off litigation.  In our sample, smaller entities are small corporations – 
not individuals, as in their study – and do not seem to be suffering a lack of choice of 
using licensing arrangements to avoid litigation.  In fact, they seem to be considering 
a wider range of strategies than this strict substitution.  This may indicate that the 
Lanjouw -Schankerman entry concerns may apply more strictly to individuals than to 
smaller entities in general.  We receive even more limited support for Lerner’s (1995) 
contention that high litigation costs could cause research to be redirected away from 
litigious areas.  Rather, we receive more support for the view that firms with high 
litigation costs may exploit their technologies by licensing them to firms with lower 
litigation costs, while leaving the area of research unchanged.  In fact, if one re-casts 
the Lerner model with an option of licensing, this could easily be the result, as we will 
detail later.  This would imply, in turn, that litigation costs are not a barrier to entry 
into research areas at the “design” level of this industry – even in highly competitive 
research areas -- even though they may be a barrier to enter the “hub” group.   
    
     We are not the first to use survey data to gather information on technology 
management.  A recent series of papers1 uses survey data to frame further empirical 
work on various technologies to address questions that are similar to ours.  Our study 
differs in that it is focussed on GM food and its unique issues (such as the 
patentability of genes), as well as being quite recent.  The latter allows us to check 
some of the hypotheses that have been put forward in the last few years regarding the 
role of litigation in intellectual property strategy.   While supporting empirical work 
using a large data set would be desirable, there are several impediments to this in the 
area of our work.  First, because GM animal and medical research involve very 
different competitor groups both at the product market and the research stages, our 
work is focussed solely on GM plants, limiting the amount of data potentially 
available for econometric analysis2.  Second, genetically modified food is still, even at 
the time of writing, a new technology on which relatively little data is available even 
without the further area restrictions we have imposed.  Finally, GM food research 
often represents only a portion of the overall research projects of the firms involved in 
                                                          
1 See Hall and Ziedonis(2001), Ziedonis(2000), Sakakibara and Branstetter(2001) and Cohen, Nelson 
and Walsh(2000) for some examples. 
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the area.  Using more general statistics on these research programmes could, then, be 
misleading to the extent that GM food represents a small percent of their overall 
research expenditure and so is not necessarily determinate in overall strategy.  Our 
preference, then, is to present the survey on its own as suggestive of areas for future 
probing as the industry develops. 
 
     The paper will now proceed to describe our hypotheses.  Next, we briefly discuss 
the survey.  A copy of the survey questions is attached as an appendix at the end of 
this paper.  We then present our findings in more detail.  The last section of the paper 
presents some concluding remarks.         
 
Our Hypotheses  
 
     As a first step towards discussing policy towards firms in the area of GM food, we 
need to define the scope of the industry.  In particular, we need to know whether this 
industry should be considered, for the purposes of analysing behaviour, as separate 
from the traditional plant breeding industry, other areas of biotechnology, or any other 
group.  In terms of our survey respondents, we need to know from them which entities 
they consider to be their competitors.   
 
     The definition of a market is a relatively explored concept in the area of 
competition policy and, in particular, merger policy.  Mergers in concentrated 
industries are reviewed for their impact on welfare by competition authorities.  Since 
concentration will tend to increase the more narrowly a market is defined, the 
definition of the market is crucial to determining whether this review will take place 
and on what terms.  Clearly, too, the types of behaviour that could be expected of 
firms in a relatively concentrated industry would differ from those in a relatively 
fragmented industry.   
 
     At the heart of most concepts of market definition is the idea of substitutability.  In 
merger policy, this is reflected in some measures of price elasticity of demand, or 
predicted price responses in the face of a hypothetical increase in industry 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 Our scope includes genetic modifications to plants directly incorporated into food and genetic 
modification techniques applicable to plant-based food.   
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concentration.  This type of exercise is particularly difficult to conduct for emerging 
industries: information on prices and products may not be readily available and 
substantial change in supply or demand conditions may occur in a short period, 
resulting in traditional analysis’ giving only a fleeting glimpse of the industry.  
Simply waiting to see how the market will develop as it matures is not always an 
option, as merger activity in the early days of an industry can be quite frequent.  GM 
food is a prime example of this, with extremely high merger activity in the late 
nineteen nineties3 and moderate levels still continuing.  As a result, the Competition 
Commission Guidelines allow the Commission to consider how rivalry may be 
expected to develop over time, relying on survey and other “soft” data in cases where 
hard information is limited4.   
 
     The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing Intellectual Property, used in the 
United States, extend the concept of market to “innovation markets”, where such a 
market consists of “the research and development directed to particular new or 
improved goods and processes…and close substitutes.”5  Innovation markets give us 
an idea of the prospective universe of firms that will be product market competitors in 
the future, and hence are relevant to rapidly developing new fields, such as GM food.  
In this sense, we need information from our respondents not only on their product 
market competition, but on the competitors they face in research.   
 
     We used the survey as an instrument to elicit this information by asking our 
respondents which entities they viewed broadly as product market competitors, as 
well as how many products competed directly with their GM products6.  Hence, we 
have questions set to investigate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  GM food constitutes a separate industry from non-GM food. 
 
                                                          
3 Counting the activity of the top producers in this area only, over the last ten years there have been 
close to fifty mergers. 
4 See Competition Commission Guidelines (2003).  
5 1995 Guidelines, Section 3.2.3, as quoted in Scotchmer (2004). 
6 A companion test would measure the substitutability of GM and non-GM crops more directly.  This 
has been discussed, but no definitive measure of cross-elasticity has been developed to our knowledge.  
For more information on the usage and pricing of GM and non-GM crops, see Fernandez-Cornejo and 
McBride (2002). 
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     Once the market has been defined, we need some measure of market power in 
order to discuss the structure of the industry as well as public policy towards it.  
Market shares in output markets are a standard measure, but current market shares in 
an emerging market may not be reflective of even near term structure.  An alternative 
would be to build an intellectual-property based market structure measure as a means 
of implementing the innovation market concept.  In theoretical models of patent 
design, patents often are taken as synonymous with monopoly power in output 
markets7.  If we take this on face value, then it suggests that patent counts in subfields 
(such as corn or soy) could be used as a proxy for market power derived from the 
innovation market.  There are several problems with using patent counts to reflect 
monopoly power, however.  First, in many markets, survey evidence indicates that 
market power comes from factors other than patents, most notably learning by doing, 
secrecy, and sales efforts8.  It should be noted, however, that the evidence varies 
considerably by industry, with drugs standing out as one where patents are viewed as 
highly effective.  Before proceeding with a patent count, then, we must check with 
our participants that the standard conception from theoretical models that patents are 
important determinants of market power holds for this industry.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  Patents are an important “prospective” indicator of market power in 
this industry.   
 
     Second, pure patent counts do not correct for the difference in relative importance 
of patents in generating market power or for their cross effects in building patent 
portfolios that effectively create market power.  Most patents, whatever the field, are 
relatively unimportant.  This is true for GM food as well.  For example, if one were to 
use forward citations by other patents as a measure of importance of patents, for all 
GM plant patents in the United States granted as of the end of 2000, 25% still had 
zero citations four years later and 53% had two or less.  The equivalent percentages 
for our respondent sample are 37% with no forward citations at all four years on, and 
80% with two or less.  To address the patent count – market power link, Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2004) develop an index of patent characteristics that can be correlated 
with economic value for firms and so can be taken as a measure of the relative 
                                                          
7 For a summary of theoretical models of patent design, see Scotchmer(2004). 
8 See Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) for relevant survey data.  
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commercial importance of patented technology, following on work by others9 who 
have used forward citations as a measure of importance.  For our work, forward 
citations will be retained as a primary measure of importance, as this is the part of the 
Lanjouw-Schankerman index that has the most salience in the related industry of 
biotechnology and as the other aspects of the index have less compelling justification 
in our sample10.   For some examples where actual market shares are available several 
years later, weighted patent share measures are computed and compared with actual 
market shares as a means of discussing how accurate patent shares are in predicting 
market power for this industry.  If they are accurate, then an implication is that the 
concentration of weighted patent portfolios can be an important candidate tool for 
evaluating future market power.      
 
     Finally, in the field of GM food where regulatory approval for commercialisation 
is required, patent counts – even weighted ones – do not account for the concentrating 
influence of the regulatory process.  Where regulatory approval is very costly, this 
influence can be significant, so that patent counts should be taken – at best – as a 
probable lower bound on the true “prospective” level of concentration in GM food.  
We postulate two possible mechanisms by which regulation could concentrate this 
industry.  First, firms with extensive experience with similar regulatory approval 
processes might have a higher level of expertise than those with little experience.  
This "learning" effect could give firms with more experience an edge early on in this 
industry, but might disappear over time as more firms gained similar portfolios of 
experience.  A second mechanism is simpler: the cost of regulatory approval could 
serve as an entry cost to the industry, reducing the number of firms that this industry 
could support in the "downstream" stage after regulatory approval.  This barrier could 
be expected to persist over time.  Together, these two mechanisms could also lead to 
extensive licensing, as smaller patent holders attempt to avoid regulatory approval by 
selling their technology to their larger, and more experienced, rivals.  Hence, we 
expect the industry to concentrate around firms with the “complementary skill” of 
                                                          
9 For example, see Trajtenberg (1990).  Also, see Hall et al. (2005) for discussion. 
10 The number of claims in the patent is the other part of the index that receives considerable weight for 
biotechnology in Lanjouw and Schankerman’s work.  In fact, the number of claims has increased 
considerably in the field of GM food over the last twenty years, but at the same time each individual 
claim has become far less cited.  As a result, number of claims alone would appear to overstate the 
importance of patents with multiple claims.  See Regibeau and Rockett (2004) for more discussion of 
number of claims as a measure of importance in the field of GM plants.   
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gaining regulatory approval, whereas a second tier of “design” firms produces patents 
as a final output for license to the firms with regulatory ability.  Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001) note a similar “two tier” structure emerging in the semiconductor industry in 
the 1980s, with design firms not undertaking the (large and growing) cost of 
manufacturing facilities.   Summarising, we have questions aimed at probing the 
following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Regulation has a concentrating influence on GM foods, due to the 
combined effects of expertise and (fixed) entry cost.   
 
Hypothesis 4: Industry participants delegate regulatory approval by means of  
licensing agreements to a core of firms, resulting in increasing industry concentration 
at the approval stage and a “two-tiered” industry structure. 
 
     Within this two-tiered industry structure, we investigate the role of patents in 
generating research in the next few hypotheses.  Above, we looked at whether patents 
were a good measure of market power.  In the hypothesis below, we ask whether this 
is the reason why research in GM food occurs.  This is certainly the presumption in 
many theoretical models of the effect of patents on R&D activity11.  Sakakibara and 
Branstetter(2001), Hall and Ziedonis(2001) and Bessen and Maskin(2000) point out 
that one might expect that, to the extent that patents generate a reward to research, a 
stronger patent right would elicit more R&D.  In fact, this connection is not supported 
empirically in any of these papers and is theoretically ambiguous even if patents are 
functioning effectively as “rewards”12.  Delving deeper into the reward function of 
patents, survey results in Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) suggest that 
managers do not find patents to be the most important generators of research 
“rewards”.  An exception to this is drugs, where patents are found to be viewed as 
important to generating innovative efforts.  To the extent that GM food, as a subfield 
of biotechnology, may behave in a similar way to drugs it might be expected that 
patents would play a larger role here as well.   
                                                          
11 See Scotchmer(2004) for a summary of this link in the literature. 
12 Some models of research indicate that stronger patents imply increased research expenditure, some 
do not.  See Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) and references therein.  Intuitively, increasing patent 
strength may have more to do with the mixture of imitative and non-imitative research than the 
absolute level of total research expenditure, encouraging the latter and discouraging the former.   
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Hypothesis 5: Patents elicit GM food  research through the “reward” that monopoly 
power creates.      
 
     On the other hand, if patents do not stimulate research by means of their reward 
function, it begs the question of the role of patents in generating scientific progress .  
Theoretical models of optimal patent design as well as legal work on the patent 
system13 point to an alternative role for patents -- the “disclosure” function -- whereby 
the grant of exclusionary property rights on innovative results raises the incentive to 
disclose those results by reducing the ability of others to appropriate the gains of 
innovation.  Such disclosure is crucial, the argument goes, for furthering scientific 
progress that builds on earlier results.  If patents are, indeed, having such a function 
then they should be claimed to significantly raise the barriers to imitation.  Hence, we 
can investigate this function within our survey population.  In particular, if the 
response is positive, but the reward function response is negative, it indicates that an 
important avenue for future research on optimal patent policy would be to investigate 
more thoroughly the implications of the disclosure function of patents, as it may be 
the more salient aspect of the patent system for some populations.   
 
Hypothesis 6:  Patents function to increase incentives for disclosure of research 
results by raising the cost of imitation.   
 
     We are not just concerned with the amount of research conducted by firms, but 
also with the type of research.  A particular concern that is unique to genetic 
engineering is the patentability of genes and its effect on research priorities.  Harhoff 
et al. (2001) argue that patents on pure genetic material might not be as socially 
desirable as patents that require genetic material to be embedded in a particular 
application.  The intuition for why pure gene patents might best be patentable is that, 
in a setting where innovation is sequential (so that later innovations build on the work 
of earlier innovations), the social value of the initial innovation should include the net 
social value of subsequent innovations.  Second generation inventors should, then, be 
limited to recovering their costs, but all remaining surplus should be channelled to 
                                                          
13 See Scotchmer and Green (1990) and Matutes, Regibeau and Rockett (1996) for a discussion of the 
legal and economic aspects of the disclosure function. 
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first inventors.  As a practical matter, this would require broad patents on first 
innovations.  In the case of GM, we could conceive of such broad patents as patents 
on genes regardless of their applications.  Harhoff et al. (2001) argue that such a 
policy would be socially undesirable, however, because it directs research towards 
output that has relatively little social value: by raising the “prize” for the pure gene, it 
draws work away from applications of that gene, which is where more social value is 
generated.  For example, herbicide resistant crops are an application of GM 
technology with a value to farmers that a specific gene by itself would not have.   
     
     With our survey, we can obtain views on whether pure gene patents would, indeed, 
have an effect on the direction of research.  Hence, we have: 
 
Hypothesis 7:  Pure gene patents would cause research in this industry to be re-
directed away from applications and towards pure genetic material.     
 
     The research area of genetic manipulation potentially has a very wide set of 
applications.  Given this, we could ask whether firms tend to choose to “race” with 
each other on similar types of innovation or whether they choose very different 
trajectories to avoid each other.  Clearly, the R&D race literature does not give firm 
predictions on this point: firms may rush to the same area despite competition because 
an application appears particularly profitable, or they may avoid each other in order to 
reduce the expense incurred by racing14.  Lerner (1995), in a study of new 
biotechnology firms in the US, finds some evidence that firms avoid areas where 
other researchers have a “head start”, but is able to go further to show that that firms 
with a high cost of litigation tend to avoid research areas populated by other firms – 
particularly ones with lower litigation costs.  Hence, litigation costs appear to be 
“scaring” some firms off of certain research areas in biotechnology.  This type of 
result might be expected to come through in our sample, as GM food is a highly 
litigious area.  Although US patent litigation takes a long time to develop and work its 
way through the courts, one can observe from European data that patent oppositions 
in Europe are extremely high in GM food, at 25%.  This is three times the opposition 
rate for biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, a seemingly similar field15.  The level of 
                                                          
14 See Scotchmer (2004) for a brief summary of some of the literature on patent races.   
15 See Harhoff et al. (2001) 
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experience with some form of patent litigation in our sample is similarly high, with 
23% of our participants having experienced litigation involving the patents that form 
the basis of our survey.   
 
     While Lerner empirically verifies litigation’s link to research trajectory for 
biotechnology as a whole, the theory rests on several assumptions that may not hold 
for our sample.  In particular, it must be the case that litigation costs cannot be 
delegated by means of licensing agreements.   Consider a simple conception of the 
Lerner model.  Litigation cost is a characteristic of the firm, independent of the area 
of future research to the extent that it depends on size and past litigation experience, 
whatever the technology field.  Hence, the population of firms has two types: low and 
high litigation cost firms.  These firms may choose their area of research.  Areas of 
research are of two types: areas where other firms hold patents (“populated”) and 
areas where no other firms are working (“empty”).  Assume that, if an area is 
populated, an existing patent holder will litigate any new firm patenting in the area.  If 
the area is empty, no litigation will follow patenting.  Suppose further that litigation is 
always successful.  A prospective researcher chooses the area of research, then, by 
computing the profit of entering the populated area net of the litigation fee and 
comparing it to the profit of entering the empty area with no deductions.  As long as 
the profit of the populated area is not high enough to overcome the cost of litigation, 
the empty area will always be chosen.  For firms with higher litigation costs, the range 
of profits for which the empty area is chosen is larger.  Hence, one can conclude that 
empirical work should indicate a stronger tendency for firms that are small or have no 
litigation experience to patent in “empty” fields. 
 
     Now, suppose that we consider delegating the litigation to a licensee with lower 
litigation costs.  Suppose also that the licensor would change research area in the 
absence of a licensing agreement (so that the profits from changing field exceed those 
of staying in the populated area and shouldering the litigation cost).  Hence, for 
licensing to occur, the licensor must earn more from the licensing agreement from the 
alternative of changing field.  Suppose further that, at the lower litigation cost, 
research in the populated area is more profitable, taking into account litigation, than 
research in the empty field.  This means that litigation expense is the determining 
element of the decision, our case of interest.  In this case, there will be surplus left 
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over after the minimum license fee to induce participation is paid to the licensor.  
Still, the licensee will only accept this delegation if the revenues from the patent net 
of the (low) litigation fees exceed the profits it would make by refusing the license.  
As long as this alternative profit is small, then the licensee will always accept and 
research should be conducted in the populated area.  Therefore, no change in research 
area occurs due to the litigation expense.  Rather, firms organise litigation 
“efficiently” by delegating to the low cost firm whilst remaining in the populated area 
of research16.   
 
      Other considerations could be added as well, but the main point is that if licensing 
can be used as a tool to delegate the litigation process it separates the research from 
the litigation decision so that, while litigation and licensing strategy would be 
expected to be heavily related, litigation and research strategy might not.  At the very 
least, it could weaken the effects pointed out by Lerner.  We investigate, then, the 
research decision and the role that licensing and litigation play in that decision with 
the following hypothesis:                      
 
Hypothesis 8:  Licensing is used to delegate litigation costs in this industry. 
   
     Related to this, we consider other effects that the threat of litigation has on the 
marketing strategy of our respondents.  In particular, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) as well 
as Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) have suggested that litigation should rise as the 
cost of alternative strategies to resolve patent infringements (specifically licensing and 
out of court settlement) rise.  These alternative strategies should be more available to 
firms that have technologies available “off the shelf” to use as bargaining chips in 
cross licensing agreements, and so creates entry barriers for smaller entities.  This 
leads us to our last hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 9:  Litigation is a higher entry barrier for smaller entities  in this industry 
than for larger entities. 
                                                          
16 If patents tend to be complementary, being used within areas of research to build patent portfolios or 
being used together to generate the technology underlying a particular product, then the argument can 
be made stronger that the licensor would wish to remain in the populated field.  This is because a 
blocking patent that is key to the strength of a patent portfolio owned by the licensee could result in a 
better bargaining position for the licensor in the negotiations.   
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The Survey 
 
     We used patents from the USPTO and the EPO websites to construct a universe of 
granted patents up to the end of year 2000 in the area of GM food based on plants.  
We screened each patent by carefully reading the claims in order to classify the patent 
as applying or not applying to GM food.  This method was much more accurate than 
the standard method of using patent class as a criterion for selection, as there is no 
single patent class for that adequately captures GM food, and GM food alone17.  Our 
procedure resulted in a universe of 141 entities that were listed as assignees for 
patents on GM food.  This was our list of possible survey recipients worldwide.  We 
attempted to contact each of these entities in order to obtain agreement to respond to 
the survey.  This was not always possible.  For example, we were able to obtain no 
contact information for individuals holding patents in this area.  In all, 96 of the 
entities we were able to contact agreed to participate and received a survey.  Of these, 
we have collected 26 completed surveys. Clearly, we could not compel entities to 
respond, so our sample does not necessarily represent a random selection. Our sample 
does, however, represent a diverse cross-section, having the following characteristics:     
 
 US Canada Europe Other 
University 9 - 1 - 
Small 
Firms 
4 
 
1  -  
Large 
Firms 
- - 5  
 
1  
Gov. 
Agencies 
- 2 1 2 
 
                                                          
17 For example, the 800 class groups all plant patents, whatever the technology that generates them.  
Class 435 relates closer to genetic manipulation but includes plants, animals, and some medical 
applications.   
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     While we divided our responses from firms into those under 1000 employees 
("small") and those over 1000 ("large") employees, the actual responses fell into a 
"small entity" group composed of fewer than 200 employees and a "large entity" 
group composed of over 2500 employees.  As a result, small firms refer to very small 
firms in our sample, while large firms are very large.    
 
     In each case we asked to speak with a person who was knowledgeable about the 
questions we asked.  As our questions touched upon a number of different policies 
(research strategy, patenting, litigation, product market competition and so on), there 
were times when we had to contact a number of different people within the same 
enterprise to obtain informed responses.  Further, we attempted to have questions that 
could be “matched” to detect inconsistencies in the answers, possibly related to 
misrepresentations reflecting particular agendas supported by survey participants, as 
well as to balance responses from respondents with different characteristics (and so, 
perhaps, opposing agendas).  Hence, our discussion of the hypotheses often relies on 
taking several responses together to form an overall narrative rather than on single 
responses.  We also supplemented the paper version of the survey with telephone 
contact, which was aimed both at making sure that the survey represented the true 
rather than the biased views of the respondents, as well as at clarifying any 
confusions.  Overall, we detected relatively few contradictions that would lead one to 
be suspicious of the veracity of the answers; however, the responses represent at best 
the perceptions of some industry participants, which are undoubtedly coloured by the 
type of organisation that the respondent represented and the experience that each 
organisation had had in this field. Finally, we collected the data under a 
confidentiality agreement that only allows us to release aggregated responses in the 
discussion that follows.        
 
Findings 
 
Discussion of Hypotheses 1 and 2:  Industry Definition and Patents as a Measure of 
Market Power 
 
     Our first hypothesis was that GM food represented a different industry from others, 
specifically from traditional breeding and other biotechnology.  We asked respondents 
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how many firms were viewed as important product market competitors and, in a 
separate question, research competitors.  Respondents were also invited, but not 
obliged, to name competitors in each market.  Overall, just under half (46%) cited at 
least one competitor in the relevant product market.  The named competitors were 
drawn overwhelmingly from the same set of large research and manufacturing firms18.  
This set provided little support for a hypothesis that competitors were drawn from 
traditional breeders or biotechnology firms outside of agricultural applications.  
Furthermore, those naming competitors listed the same research competitors as 
product market competitors, suggesting that the “invention” market is comprised of, 
for all intents and purposes, the same group as the final product market19.  In fact, the 
attention seemed to be focussed on a core group of large firms (“hub”), with a fringe 
of entities (“spokes”), largely in separate applications, working on development only 
and not viewing each other as competitors20.          
 
     Those not listing competitors fell into two groups: those that said definitively that 
they had no important competitors and those that did not know to what use their 
technology was being put21.  Interestingly, half the universities named firms as 
important research competitors, and those naming firms listed the same group of large 
firms as the others22.  This could suggest two things.  First, it could suggest that 
universities could be considered as part of the “spokes” of this industry, contributing 
technology by license to the core group.  Second, it could suggest that this is an area 
where there is considerable similarity between the research agendas of firms and 
universities (or government bodies).  In fact, while Henderson, Trajtenberg and Jaffe 
(1998) find that university research is more “general” and more “important”23 than 
                                                          
18Of the competitors that were named, two out of seventeen could be considered small.  One of these 
small firms has significant investment by very large partner firms that were members of the group 
consistently named by others as the competitor set. 
19 In fact, even those that did not name competitors indicated that the research competitors were 
generally the same as the product market competitors. 
20 Only one firm listed another set of small firms as working in a similar area. 
21 Note that these were all universities or governmental bodies with process technologies on license to 
other entities.  Those not knowing to what use the patent had been put were not necessarily those 
charging a zero license fee.  One could perhaps infer that these were cases where a standard licensing 
contract was negotiated, based on a royalty plus a fee that was designed to cover the cost of the 
research so that the actual use to which the technology was put would not be vital to knowing how to 
set up the license.  
22 Universities also listed the same firms in the product and research markets when they were named 
and, even when they were not named, generally noted that the two groups were the same.     
23 For a discussion of these measures and of university patenting, see Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(1998) and Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe (1997). 
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corporate research across a wide variety of fields, Conti, Regibeau and Rockett (2003) 
find empirically that there is much less difference in the field of genetically modified 
plants.  This survey, then, does not provide evidence to contradict the relative 
similarity of university and corporate work in the area of GM food24.     
 
          Our respondents appear to view themselves as truly having some monopoly 
position.  When asked whether the product in which their GM technology was 
embedded (either produced by themselves or by another firm under license) had a 
direct product market competitor produced by another entity, the unanimous response 
was in the negative25.  Clearly, then, each of these respondents derives at least some 
degree of market power either directly or indirectly from the technology.  The 
research competitors cited on the surveys should, then, be viewed as working in the 
same general research area, but perhaps not developing precisely the same 
applications as the respondents.  It also is likely that, taking these results together, 
while the precise research results may be unique at least some members of the hub 
group have enough know-how to pursue competing research if they so desire.  This 
suggests that, without patent protection, an exclusive hold on the technology would 
not be secured.  
 
     We pursued this issue by attempting to determine more directly whether patents 
were the source of this market power.  When asked by how much a lack of 
patentability would affect profits, those companies with products currently on the 
market responded, on average, that profits would drop less than 10%.  A problem with 
interpreting this response, however, is that it does not correct for the importance of the 
patents: if most patents are, indeed, “unimportant” then the bulk of them would tend 
to have very little effect on profits of firms.  In fact, the survey response distribution 
of patent importance -- as measured by forward citations by other patents -- has a 
median number of net citations received in the first four years of the patent’s life of 1 
(compared to 0 for all GM plant patents in the US through the end of 2000) but none 
over 3, missing the (slightly less than) 10% of the (US) GM plant patents that have 
                                                          
24 As an aside, there was no systematic difference between the views of private and public universities 
in any of our survey responses.   
25 We verified this by requesting an estimate of the price elasticity of demand, obtaining estimates that 
were consistent with a considerable degree of monopoly power in the output market overall. 
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more than 3 net citations in the first four years26.  Hence, while our survey does not 
reflect a less important set of patents than the broader population, (as reflected in the 
medians) our do responses tend to reflect patents that are “run of the mill” rather than 
those that are very important since we do not have any observations from the “right 
hand tail” of citations distribution.  Still, it is significant that even these “run of the 
mill” patents can account for a 10% effect on profits for this group.  We follow up, 
then, with a question more directed at the role of patents in creating market power by 
asking by how much cost and time of imitation increased due to the patent.  Here, 
firms generally responded positively, with an average rise in the cost of imitation of 
approximately 42% and an average increase in the time of imitation of 28%27.  There 
was wide variance in these numbers, ranging from zero to “prohibitively expensive” 
in terms of time or money.  Still, in light of this, perhaps the way to interpret the 
responses is that the patent is “doing its job” in creating a relatively effective barrier 
to imitation, but the distribution of patents in our survey reflects the general 
distribution of patents is that most are at best modest sources of revenue.  This 
suggests patent counts may be used to measure market power, but they should 
certainly be weighted by importance if they are to reflect actual or potential 
commercial strength in the market.                           
 
     Suppose that we were to implement weighted patent shares, then, as a measure of 
prospective market power for this industry to evaluate a merger.  For example, we 
could take all patents granted in the industry (or for the crop in question) up to four 
years before the proposed merger date and then track the citations measured during 
the first four years of the life of each of those patents (relative to the total population 
of patents that might have cited it) as a measure of its importance.  Each merging 
entity’s market share would, then, be reflected in its share of the total patents with 
each patent weighted by its importance relative to the average importance for the 
                                                          
26 As our survey tends to reflect more recently-granted patents than the overall population of GM plant 
patents, we choose to measure importance as the citations during the first four years of life rather than 
the entire lifetime citation pattern, as this latter measure would systematically favour earlier patents.  
Net citations refers to citations net of self citations.  If the citations were to include self-citations, the 
point would remain the same, however, as the percentages differ only slightly. 
27 As a comparison, Mansfield(1986) finds that most imitation costs (69% of his sample) rise less than 
20% due to patenting in a study of 33 products across a variety of industries.  18% of his sample have a 
percentage increase of 100% or more.  For our sample, and focussing on for-profit firms, we have 35% 
listing no increase in imitation cost, ¼ listing a 25% increase, ¼ listing a 50% increase, and 15% listing 
a prohibitive increase.  This is a somewhat more favourable distribution than Mansfield’s but holds for 
an industry where we might expect patents to be more powerful.   
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entire population.  As an example, if we were to do this as of the year 2000 we would 
obtain a prospective estimate of US market shares – based on US patents -- for corn of 
only 23% for Monsanto when we do not apply the weighting but 43% when the 
weighting is applied.  For soy, we obtain figures of 17% when for Monsanto when we 
do not apply the weighting and 28% when we do28.  Clearly, correcting for 
importance makes a huge difference to these figures29.      
 
     Does this represent an accurate prospective measure of actual market shares?  In 
order to do this, we need to let some time pass.  While it is a little difficult to get 
agreement as to Monsanto’s US market share and how to measure it30, a rough 
estimate is that Monsanto’s current actual market shares in the United States for corn 
and soy are 49% (up very slightly from 43% each year since 2000) and 90% (down 
very slightly from virtually the entire market each year from 2000).   These are both 
higher than our “prospective” measures, above.  While the corn figure is not very 
different from the weighted patent estimate, the soy figure is quite far off.  The 
explanation for this large difference may be the strength of certain soy patents that are 
underestimated by the citations count: some patents now owned by Monsanto underlie 
almost any GM soy currently grown.  In other words, to produce in this field, a 
license of some basic technology is very important, leading to the high share of 
Monsanto technology in this crop.  Subsequent research (which would be reflected in 
the citations count) has not yet done justice to the importance of the Monsanto patent 
portfolio in the current soy market.  This would generally be true of citations based 
measures: extremes of market importance would be relatively poorly measured by 
even weighted citations31.      
                                                          
28This calculation is based only on patents that specifically make claims applying to the crop in 
question. 
29 Normally, one would want to take into account, in a weighting measure, the expiration date of 
patents.  In the case at hand, however, the patents are recent enough that their expiration dates are not a 
major factor entering into the weighting.      
30 Market shares can be calculated by trait or by seed.  The corn figure is the percentage of the 
genetically modified crop planted accounted for by Monsanto’s brand of GM seed, including licensing.  
The second is the percentage of US planted acreage with Monsanto traits, even though the seed may 
not be sold by Monsanto.  Clearly, this is heavily influenced by licensing activity as well.  Even these 
estimates vary substantially depending on the source, however, leading to their designation as “rough”.  
Estimates of market shares can be found in Casale(2004) and McMahon(2004).    
31 Figures for other firms in corn are 13%, weighted and unweighted, for Du Pont, 15%, weighted and 
unweighted, for AgrEvo and 4% weighted but 17% unweighted for Syngenta.  Dow’s market share, 
weighted and unweighted, is negligible based on intellectual property measures.  This can be compared 
to reported market shares in corn of 40% for Du Pont (through Pioneer) and 15% for Syngenta.  
(Others were unavailable.) The Du Pont figure, unfortunately, includes a non-GM component and so is 
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     Hence, the corn and soy figures illustrate an advantage and a disadvantage of 
taking the innovation market information into account as a prospective market share 
measure: when technologies are quite powerful, their influence may be 
underestimated in weighted patent counts.  On the other hand, in the moderate ranges,  
the measure can perform relatively well.  Still, if we take the patent count calculation 
seriously, it would suggest several things.  First, in terms of soy, one would be 
concerned about increased power by a company like Monsanto in the seed industry, as 
a powerful patent position in the seed-making technology as well as seed production 
facilities would raise the possibility of foreclosure32.  This supports some recent 
decisions to enforce licensing of technology as part of acquisitions in this field33. 
Second, in terms of corn, our “prospective” measure is quite close to the actual market 
share measure, suggesting that no near term changes would normally be expected 
based on the measured technology position.  Still, the absolute measure is quite high, 
suggesting that further consolidation might be a subject of concern.  For soy, the 
intellectual property is not nearly as concentrated as the market, suggesting that 
concentration figures should drop from their current extremes.                     
 
     Hence, we have found support for relatively high concentration of this industry and 
for the use of weighted patent counts as a prospective measure of market power.  We 
have also found support for a “hub and spoke” pattern, with a relatively small number 
of large firms being the product and research market focus and many smaller design 
firms providing technology to the large firms, but not competing head to head with 
each other.  We now turn, in the discussion of the subsequent hypotheses, to the role 
of regulatory approval, patents, and litigation in generating this structure. 
 
   
Discussion of Hypotheses 3 and 4: The Role of Regulation 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
not directly comparable to the intellectual property shares.  For soy, the only other company to hold a 
significant patent portfolio is Du Pont, with an unweighted and weighted share of 33%.  All figures are 
computed using the most recent acquisitions to attribute patents to firms, but not any other marketing 
arrangements between firms.   
32 Monsanto has acquired a number of seed producers in recent years.  Most recently, it has acquired 
Seminis (February, 2005).  Seminis does not currently have a strong position in soy, however.   
33 See Hayenga(2003) for a summary of some recent decisions. 
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     We asked several questions to investigate the role of regulation in this industry, 
and its effect on competition (specifically on industry concentration).  First, we asked 
entities to map out the regulatory process to which they had had to submit their GM 
technologies.  Next, we asked about the level of costs (relative to profits) of this 
procedure, the relative burden that regulation imposed in terms of increasing the time 
to market of the technology, the change in cost of obtaining regulatory approval as the 
number of submissions increased, and the effect of a change in regulatory approval 
cost on licensing strategy.   
      
     Most entities in our sample were not directly involved in regulatory approval: only 
15% of our respondents had, themselves, submitted output to a regulatory process 
beyond patenting.  While this might appear surprising in such a highly regulated area, 
it has ready explanations.  First, some entities stated that they were participating in 
process technologies (such as technologies to induce a certain trait in any plant), so 
that regulation applied to the plant that was modified rather than to the process itself.   
For others (a further 15% of the sample) were using the patents in question merely to 
strengthen existing patent portfolios, rather than to contribute directly to the creation 
of a product, so that regulatory approval for output based on the patent was not being 
contemplated.     
 
     More importantly, three quarters (77%) of the sample were obtaining revenues 
from the patents by means of licensing agreements.  Many licensors commented that 
all regulatory costs were handled by the licensee and, as such, regulatory costs were 
not of direct concern to them.  Hence, delegating regulatory approval by means of the 
license was a regular practice in our sample.  We pursued this by asking about the 
effects that a change in regulatory cost would have on licensing strategy.  Some, 
including both firms and other entities, indicated that they had no realistic alternative 
to licensing: manufacturing was not an option for them.  Hence, they claimed, 
whatever the cost of regulatory approval, they would continue to license equally 
intensively as long as their research costs were covered.  This says two things.  First, 
the design firms were delegating both regulatory and manufacturing costs through the 
license, seemingly considering both a barrier to entry.  More interestingly, it appears 
that the main point of the license was to recoup the cost of research, leaving a large 
enough surplus to the licensee that even further increases in regulatory burden would 
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not be likely to affect the propensity to license, even though it might affect licensee 
margins.  
 
     The regulation that applied to the firms that actually had participated directly in 
regulatory approval varied substantially, with some reporting a very light and short 
burden, and others reporting a complex process taking up to ten years.   Similarly, the 
percent reduction in profits due to the regulatory process varied from (virtually) 0 to 
75%, with the higher figure associated with a complex and lengthy procedure 
involving approval by a variety of agencies.  Hence, the degree of potential entry 
deterrence that regulation creates was very uneven across our sample, when one 
considers those firms that actually submitted products to regulators.  Not surprisingly, 
the degree of reported regulatory burden was correlated with the response to the 
question of how much a 10% increase in regulatory cost would affect licensing 
activity: the higher the entity's reported regulatory burden, the larger the increase in 
licensing out that the entity said that it would conduct in response to a further increase 
in regulatory cost.  Similarly, a larger propensity to license in was reported by the 
larger firms in the sample as a response to larger regulatory cost.  This lends support 
to the comments made by current licensors that licensing is a standard tool to delegate 
regulatory approval in this industry, resulting in increasing concentration at the 
approval stage as regulatory burden increases.   
 
     In terms of learning effects, the responses that cited multiple use of the regulatory 
system reported relatively fast learning, with all learning reported as having occurred 
after a single regulatory experience, and a percent reduction in cost of regulatory 
approval upon increased submissions that was relatively modest (on the order of 
10%).  While this would reflect a relatively modest learning curve, it is the response 
of entities that actually chose to submit products themselves: the firms that perceived 
the process as too onerous – and as a result licensed out -- would not have reported a 
response to this or other regulatory questions.  Still, this response does not lend strong 
support to the need to help firms learn about the regulatory process in order to 
promote entry.     
 
     In sum, there was some support for the hypothesis that regulation is a 
concentrating influence in this industry, and that it may discourage entry into the 
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approval stage even if it does not hamper entry into generating new technologies at 
the research stage.  Learning effects, while they are present, appear to be relatively 
mild and to occur with relatively few submissions.  Hence, we appear to have some 
support for regulation’s playing a role in generating a two-tier structure in this 
industry for those technologies subject to a large regulatory hurdle, but also a 
suggestion that this is not a short term phenomenon that could be overcome by 
sponsored learning.   
 
Discussion of Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7: Patent Policy in GM  
 
     We asked several questions to elicit the role that patents were playing in this 
industry.  These included questions about whether patents were a way of stimulating 
research in this field, the precise nature of the protection that patents afforded the 
researchers, the opinion of the respondents on whether genes alone should be 
protected and, more concretely, whether the respondents would change their research 
plans if patents on genes alone were made available.  Conversely, we also asked 
whether the lack of patents on GM technology would decrease research in this area.   
 
            The overwhelming majority of respondents, firms and universities included, 
thought that their research spending in this area would not have decreased if patents 
had been unavailable on GM innovations.  Unsurprisingly, no universities found 
patenting to be relevant to their research decision.  More surprisingly, few more of the 
companies did.  Even when we looked only at the firms that were continuing to 
receive patents regularly in this area (in other words, those that listed further patents 
in the area of GM food that they had received since the end of 2000), the responses 
did not give a greater weight to patents in terms of stimulating research. One reason 
for this is that some patent holders – including firms -- reported receiving 
compensation in ways other than direct patent “rewards”.  Specifically, research funds 
from an external source before undertaking research were cited in several instances34.  
As long as research costs were covered, these entities noted that this funding 
determined whether the research occurred and what the subject of the research was:  
the patent position did not have a direct effect.  For these firms, any income from 
                                                          
34 These included direct grants and general corporate funding (such as venture capital). 
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licensing the patent was viewed as “icing on the cake”, but was not determinate.  In 
this sense, the design firms seemed “one step removed” from any incentives that 
patents might create. A second reason was that just over half of the companies 
commented in the margin that GM was not the main line of research of the company.  
Instead, one can infer from the comments that the GM patents were either offshoots of 
other research programmes or a way of keeping abreast of a new developing field, but 
not a main strategic area of development.  In this sense, patentable innovations in this 
area were "fortuitous" for these firms, rather than planned revenue-generators: they 
contributed to the existence of the firm, but their revenues were not determinate to its 
research focus.      
 
      In order to verify the role of patents, we asked several more questions regarding 
the reasons for patents to have value in this area.  While universities continued to 
view patents as unimportant to their research agendas, almost half the relevant firms 
reported that profits would fall if GM innovations were not patentable.  In other 
words, while the research would have occurred in the absence of patents, the patents 
were still, in fact, contributing currently to profits.  This implies that patents must be 
raising the overall returns to the entity and so increase the returns to research as an 
activity even if they are not the reason that particular research trajectories are chosen.  
Hence, we receive some support that patents do create a “reward”, but this reward is 
not what determined whether the research supporting these patents had been chosen.   
 
     As was mentioned earlier, patents were viewed as contributing significantly to 
increased imitation cost or time by our respondents.  One interpretation of this 
apparent imitation barrier is that patents are functioning as relatively effective 
property rights, mapping out areas of exclusivity for their owners.  In turn, this 
implies that the role of the patent in increasing the incentives to disclose research 
progress may be important.  For some of our sample the disclosure function was noted 
explicitly as the reason to patent: universities and non-profits stated that the patent 
was being used as a way of “getting information out”.  Further, these entities indicated 
that their answers to the effect on imitation cost and time were affected by their 
eagerness to disclose: they felt that the patent would not increase imitation cost partly 
because they intended to facilitate future research in the area.  For firms, the imitation 
cost and time effect was much higher, suggesting that the patents’ exclusionary rights 
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potentially had “bite” in terms of increasing appropriability even if universities and 
non-profits did not choose to take advantage of this35.  Interestingly, this disclosure 
function of intellectual property protection has received little attention in the 
Economics literature, despite the weight given to it by this population.             
 
     Finally, we asked all respondents to give an opinion on whether patents in this area 
should be available on genes alone and, if they were, what difference this would make 
to their research.  Consistent with our other responses on the effect of patents on 
research trajectory, we obtained only negative responses to the first question and only 
a single positive answer to the second.  As there are ethical and legal ramifications of 
granting patents on genes alone, these responses may have been motivated by purely 
non-economic considerations.  Unfortunately, no respondent chose to elaborate on 
their reasons.  Still, we are left to conclude that our survey indicates no support that 
change in patent “breadth” would have an effect on the direction of research, as 
reported by those currently in the field36.        
 
     Our conclusions regarding patent policy from this section are, then, mixed.  While 
patents clearly play a role in generating revenues for the entities involved, it is not 
clear that these revenues are the reason that the specific research occurred in the first 
place, even for private firms and those continuing to work in the field.  Hence, while a 
role for the “reward” function of patents exists for the sample in that profits would 
generally fall in the absence of patents, the more salient function of patents that came 
through in the survey was to create property rights that effectively raised the barrier to 
imitation.  In this sense, the relatively under-studied role of patents in encouraging 
disclosure of results came through strongly in the sample.  Perhaps the responses 
reflected the view of many of our respondents that they were “one step removed” 
from the patent system as a means of generating research.  Consistent with other 
responses on the lack of patentability’s effect on research priorities, all but one of our 
respondents felt that pure gene patents would make little difference to the type of 
research they are doing.    
                                                          
35 Perhaps surprisingly, the one group that appeared to regard patents as an important means of eliciting 
research in this area was the governmental category.  On the other hand, other responses indicate that 
the income from the patents was not a primary concern to this group.  Perhaps this has something to do 
with the compensation systems in these agencies.   
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Discussion of Hypotheses 8 and 9:  The roles of litigation and licensing  
 
     A final area of concern was the enforcement of patent rights, and the role of  
litigation in intellectual property management.  First, we investigated the views of 
participants on the cost burden of litigation.  Second, we explored strategies of 
reducing or avoiding this cost.  While we asked directly about licensing as a strategy 
for avoiding litigation, we also obtained confirming evidence (to be discussed below) 
that licensing was a rather standard response to potential or actual litigation.  In order 
to obtain information about the relative bargaining positions of the firms performing 
the licensing, we asked about the percentage of profits that the licensor attempted to 
recover from any licensing out and the structure of the licensing contracts.   
 
      We had understood before starting our work that licensing activity was extremely 
high in GM food. As we mentioned earlier, this was confirmed in our sample.  For our 
participants, licensing contracts have primarily an up-front fixed fee plus royalty 
structure, although a minority of our respondents (27%) had a percentage of their 
earnings coming from either pure royalty or pure fixed fee contracts.  On average, just 
over half (51%) of the contracts issued by these firms were exclusive.  Covering the 
cost of patenting was noted by several respondents as the reason for the fixed fee.  
Finally, the percentage of profits that entities attempted to recover was either quite 
high for the for-profit firms (averaging 62%) or zero for the non-profits, universities 
and other entities.  In the latter case, presumably licensing attempted to cover the 
costs of the patent only, even when a royalty was used as part of the contract.   
 
     Based on our survey, it appears that licensing plays a series of roles in this 
industry.   As was mentioned earlier, it clearly is a major source of revenue for a 
number of our respondents, constituting 100% of revenues in a number of cases.  
Further, these respondents anticipated a significant share (more than 80%) of the 
profits generated by the technology, indicating a relatively strong bargaining position 
in this industry for licensors.  Licensing also plays a role in avoiding litigation, 
however, ranking as the strategy of choice to respond to litigation for 42% of our 
                                                                                                                                                                      
36 A single firm did stand out by responding positively to this question.  This firm also viewed patents 
as more important in directing research in general than other respondents. 
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respondents.  Cross licensing came in as the strategy of choice to avoid litigation for 
30% of our respondents.  Six respondents cited various other strategies, including 
conducting new R&D and threatening litigation to avoid litigation.  When asked 
directly whether a rise in the cost of enforcing the patent would result in an increase in 
licensing activity, 42% responded positively.  This appears to reflect a strong view 
that licensing is a standard response to litigation and further that the higher the 
litigation costs, the more licensing (out and in) one might expect. 
  
       The ranking of cross licensing and licensing to avoid litigation did not appear to 
depend on the size of the entity, with small entities actually listing cross licensing as 
the preferred response more frequently than large entities.  The larger firms had far 
more litigation experience surrounding the patents in question in our survey, although 
they also tended to have older patents so that their exposure per patent was longer.  
Further, it is not the more important patents in the sample that are the more litigated 
patents.  In fact, the more litigated ones tend to be somewhat less important than the 
average37 and have almost exactly the mean number of backwards citations.  Hence, 
one cannot conclude that our sample represents a case where more important patents, 
patents with a longer genealogy or patents belonging to smaller entities tend to attract 
more litigation.  In this sense, our sample does not reflect the concerns of Lanjouw 
and Schankerman that certain types of patents or patent holders tend to attract 
litigation.   
 
     Several comments are in order here, however.  First, our sample does not include 
individuals.  These are contrasted with corporations in the Lanjouw and Schankerman 
paper to make the points that smaller entities might be involved more frequently in 
litigation as opposed to licensing arrangements.  Our responses would suggest that 
perhaps this sort of bias may apply more to individuals than to even quite small 
corporations, as even the small firms in our sample appeared to be “playing the 
licensing game” as much as the big players.  On the other hand, and more in line with 
Lanjouw and Schankerman’s work, it was exclusively small entities in our sample 
that listed litigation as a response to the threat of litigation, albeit sometimes qualified 
by specifying that a partner would have to be found in order to bring litigation.   
                                                          
37 Again, importance is measured by net forward citations in the first four years of the patent’s life 
corrected for the size of the potential citing population at the time of grant. 
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     The fact that litigation and cross-licensing both are listed relatively frequently as 
preferred strategies for smaller firms leaves us with a bit of a puzzle.  The explanation 
for this may be that size in terms of employees does not necessarily correspond with 
size in terms of stock of technology.  Those that have little to trade could be those 
volunteering litigation while those that have much to trade would not.  It could also 
suggest that litigation and cross licensing are viewed as complements, by some of 
these respondents rather than as substitutes.  Clearly, this is a very different 
conception of the relation between these two instruments.  It may also be that cross-
licensing has a cost that is not much lower than that of litigation when one takes into 
account the implicit cost of licensing when it was not optimal to do so in the absence 
of the possibility of litigation.  In this sense, cross licensing and litigation could be 
alternatives between which some respondents were indifferent.  The indifference 
could lead to the ambiguous ranking of these alternatives.  Third, our smaller entities 
appeared to be considering a larger list of alternatives than just litigation and cross 
licensing alone: partnering along with litigation may be one way of addressing the 
Lanjouw-Schankerman concerns in a highly litigious industry.  In fact, Harhoff et al 
(2001) find that some litigation is more broadly based in GM food than in other parts 
of biotechnology.  Finally, to the extent that higher litigation rates in this industry 
reflect less selection about who gets litigated, it may simply be that there is less 
selection of the type that Lanjouw and Schankerman observe occurring for this group.  
In short, our responses indicated that further study of this issue would be important, as 
the interaction between licensing and litigation could be fairly complex.        
 
     Our respondents stated unanimously that a change in litigation cost would not 
affect research focus.  The one that indicated that a rise in litigation cost would affect 
research indicated that it would need to work harder to create a stronger patent 
thicket, not that it would change research focus.  In this sense, we received no 
confirmation in our sample for Lerner’s theory of a link between litigation cost and 
research trajectory.  This is somewhat surprising given the litigiousness of the area.  
Further, for those respondents listing infringement or invalidity suits as part of the 
total cost of maintaining their patents in this area, these costs averaged a significant 
20% of the total costs of patenting (including research costs).  In addition, those firms 
that noted that they no longer worked in the GM food area were exclusively large 
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whereas those that noted that they were continuing to work in the area were 
exclusively small, with a mix of litigation experience in both groups.  This is not 
consistent with high litigation cost driving firms into other areas of research: it should 
be the small firms (those with a high cost of litigation) that are leaving.  There may be 
an explanation for this that is consistent with Lerner’s results, however.  As was 
mentioned above, our respondents reported a strong linkage between litigation cost 
and licensing activity.  In fact, a number of respondents specifically noted that 
licensees were handling all litigation costs.  As our section on hypotheses stated, once 
licensing is introduced, the research-litigation link can be broken.  In fact, this may be 
precisely what is occurring for this sample.  
   
     Hence, it appears that licensing is used to delegate many costs in this industry: 
litigation costs, regulatory costs and manufacturing costs.  While this has implications 
for a relatively concentrated “hub” at the centre of the industry, it also implies that 
firms that view themselves as “inefficient” at litigation or regulatory approval can 
participate at the research stage and license the technology rather than avoid the 
research area altogether.   
 
Conclusions 
 
     Our survey responses have suggested several conclusions about the GM food 
industry.  First, the industry appears to be separate and highly concentrated, 
comprising a small hub that conducts research, regulatory approval and 
manufacturing and a large number of spokes focussing on technology provision to the 
hub.  The concentration levels for both innovation and current market provision of 
approved GM food crops appears high compared to normal triggers for scrutiny of 
further merger activity.  Licensing is undertaken to delegate regulatory and litigation 
costs to the hub, resulting in the “two tier” structure of the industry.  Regulatory costs 
appear to be barriers to entry to the hub, but not to be primarily due to learning 
economies.  In this sense, they are persistent concentrating influences, not likely to be 
largely affected by sponsored learning for industry participants.  Patents, while clearly 
generating income for industry participants, do not appear to be directing research 
through their reward function.  In particular, we did not receive much support for the 
idea that targeted changes in patent scope – and in particular, patents on pure genes -- 
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would affect research trajectories in this field.  Finally, litigation appears not to affect 
research trajectory heavily in our sample, perhaps due to the interaction between 
litigation, research and licensing strategies.  Clearly, as our sample is small and not 
necessarily random, all these conclusions must be qualified as suggestive rather than 
definitive. 
 
     Our responses also suggested several areas for future work.  First, weighted patent 
counts fared relatively well to predict moderate concentration levels, but fared less 
well in predicting extremes of concentration for this industry.  The contribution of 
weighted patent counts to the implementation of the innovation market concept to 
measure prospective concentration in an industry could well be evaluated across a 
wider set of industries and a wider time period.  Second, our responses point clearly to 
an important interaction between licensing and litigation.  The nature of this 
interaction is not, however, completely clear.  These alternatives are not necessarily 
substitutes in all cases, licensing is not necessarily the only alternative considered to 
litigation, and the implicit cost of licensing compared to that of litigation is also 
difficult to judge.  Third, our responses pointed to a relatively important role in 
intellectual property strategy for disclosure and perhaps less emphasis on reward.  
This bears more investigation, as the disclosure function is the less studied of these 
two functions of patents.            
 
   
 32
References 
 
Bessen, James and E. Maskin. (2000),  “Sequential Innovation, Patents, and 
Imitation”,  Massachusetts Institute of Technology Working Paper 00-01. January. 
 
Casale, Carl. (2004), “Monsanto: Momentum in the Field”,  
Available:http//:www.Monsanto.com/Monsanto/content/investor/financial/presentatio
ns/2004/monmouth2.pdf (Accessed: 12 January, 2005) 
 
Cohen, Wesley, R. Nelson and J. Walsh. (2000),  “Protecting Their Intellectual 
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or 
Not)”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7552. February. 
 
Competition Commission (2003), Merger References: Competition Commission 
Guidelines. United Kingdom. 
 
Conti, Mauricio, P. Regibeau, and K. Rockett (2003), “How Basic is Patented 
University Research? The Case of GM Crops”,  University of Essex Discussion Paper 
558. June. 
 
Fernandez-Cornejo, Jorge and W. McBride. (2002), “Adoption of Bioengineered 
Crops”, ERS Agricultural Economic Report No. AER810. May. 67 pages. 
 
Hall, Bronwyn, A. Jaffe and M. Trajtenberg (2004), “Market Value and Patent 
Citations”, Rand Journal of Economics. Vol. 36, no. 1. Spring.  
 
Hall, Bronwyn and R. Ziedonis. (2001),  “The Patent Paradox Revisited: An 
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry 1979-1995”,  Rand 
Journal of Economics.  Vol. 32, no. 1. Spring. Pp. 101-128. 
 
Harhoff, Dietmar, P. Regibeau and K. Rockett (2001),  “Some Simple Economics of 
GM Food”, Economic Policy.  Vol. 33. October.  pp. 265-299. 
 
 33
Hayenga, Marvin. (2003),  “Structural Change in the Biotech Seed and Chemical 
Industrial Complex”, AgBioForum: The Journal of Agrobiotechnology Management 
& Economics.  Vol. 1, no. 2. Article 2. 
 
Henderson, Rebecca, A. Jaffe and M. Trajtenberg. (1998), “Universities as a Source 
of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965-
1988”, Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 80. Pp. 119-127.  
 
Lanjouw, Jenny, and M. Schankerman (2001),  “Characteristics of Patent Litigation: 
A Window on Competition”, Rand Journal of Economics. Vol. 32, no. 1. Spring. Pp. 
129-151. 
 
Lanjouw, Jenny, and M. Schankerman (2004),  “Patent Quality and Research 
Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators”, The Economic Journal. 
Vol. 114. April. 441-465. 
 
Lerner, Joshua (1995),  “Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors”, Journal of Law 
and Economics. Vol. XXXVIII, no. 2. October. 463-496. 
 
Levin, Richard, A. Klevorick, R. Nelson and S. Winter (1987), “Appropriating the 
Returns from industrial R&D”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Pp. 783-820.  
 
Mansfield, Edwin (1986), “Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study”, 
Management Science. Vol. 32. Pp. 173-181. 
 
Matutes, Carmen, P. Regibeau, K. Rockett (1996),  “Optimal Patent Design and the 
Diffusion of Innovations”, Rand Journal of Economics. 27(1). Pp. 60-83. 
 
McMahon, Karen. (2004), “Seed Tech Titans”. Available: http://apply-
mag.com/mag/farming_seed_tech_titans_2/ (Accessed: 12 January, 2005) 
 
Regibeau, Pierre and K. Rockett (2004), “Are More Important Patents Approved 
More Slowly and Should They Be?”, University of Essex.  Mimeo. November. 
 
 34
Sakakibara, Mariko, and L Branstetter (2001),  “Do Stronger patents Induce More 
Innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms”, Rand Journal of 
Economics. Vol. 32, no. 1. Spring. Pp. 77-100. 
 
Scotchmer, Suzanne (2004) Innovation and Incentives. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press.   
 
Scotchmer, Suzanne and J. Green (1990),  “Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law”, 
Rand Journal of Economics. Vol. 21, no. 1. Pp. 131-146. 
 
Trajtenberg, Manuel. (1990), “A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the 
Value of Innovations”, Rand Journal of Economics.  Vol. 20. Pp. 172-187. 
 
Trajtenberg, Manuel, R. Henderson, and A. Jaffe (1997), “University versus 
Corporate Patents: A Window on the Basicness of Invention”,  Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology. Vol. 5. Pp. 19-50.   
 
Ziedonis, Rosemarie (2000), “Patent Protection and Firm Strategy in the 
Semiconductor Industry”, PhD. Dissertation, Walter A. Haas School of Business, 
University of California, Berkeley.   
 35
Appendix A: Survey 
 
     A copy of our survey follows.  A separate page was sent to collect basic company 
information (such as number of employees, country of incorporation and so on). 
 
Survey Number  
 
 
 
 
Survey on Patents, Regulation and Genetic Modification 
 
 
     Thank you for participating in the survey.  The questions in the survey 
refer to the following patents, which the USPTO (U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office) or the EPO  (European Patent Office) indicate have been assigned to 
you and which have application to the area of genetically modified food: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you are aware of other patents that you hold and are applicable to GM 
food, please indicate their numbers here: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     This survey asks you questions regarding the research leading up to the 
patents listed above, and the impact of patent policy and regulatory policy on 
your decisions to participate in this area.  Many of the following questions ask 
for percentages.  These refer to approximations by you of the actual 
percentages in each case.  Further, we have asked some hypothetical 
questions.  We are interested here in your opinion.  In all cases, we are 
interested in your experience and your opinions, not those of other companies 
or individuals who have participated in this field.          
 
     Thank you for your participation. 
 
      
 
 
 
Dr. Pierre Regibeau               Dr. Katharine Rockett 
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1. Have any of these patents reached the commercialisation stage, or are 
they still under development? 
 
   Some commercialised        Development only    (circle as appropriate) 
 
 
2. Which of the following is the primary source of revenues from each of 
these patents?  (please write a letter next to each patent number on the 
front page of this survey) 
 
a. Embodiment in a process that your company uses? 
b. Embodiment in a product that your company sells? 
c. Through licensing contracts to other firms? 
d. Through cross-licensing agreements with other firms? 
e. Indirectly, through increased sales of other products your firm 
produces (for example, increased sales of herbicide as a result of 
GM seed sales)? 
f. Through strengthening your intellectual property protection of other 
innovations (for example, by creating a defensible patent position 
by protecting the process from which a product is created as well 
as the product itself)? 
 
 
3. For the patents that are embodied in products, which of these products 
has a close substitute that is produced by a competitor?  (Write the patent 
numbers below) 
 
 
 
 
 
4. For the patents that are embodied in products, which of these products 
has a close substitute that is produced either by your firm or with patents 
that you have on license to another firm?  (Write the patent numbers 
below) 
 
 
 
 
 
5. On average, what percent of your actual R&D spending on GM would you 
have made if this type of innovation had not been patentable? 
 
            ________  0%  (patents are irrelevant to your R&D spending) 
            _________ 25% 
            _________ 50% 
            _________ 75% 
            _________ 100% 
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6. There is still some uncertainty on whether claims covering genes alone, 
that is, without any corresponding function or application, will be granted 
and upheld in court.   In your opinion, would granting and upholding 
patents on genes alone be a good idea? 
 
            Yes                        No               (circle as appropriate) 
 
 
7. If claims covering genes alone were granted and upheld, would your 
company increase or decrease its spending on research and development 
in the area of genetic modification?  
 
          __________ the change would not affect our research and 
                            development spending                       
          __________  25% decrease       __________ 25% increase 
          __________  50% decrease       __________ 50% increase 
          __________  75% decrease       __________ 75% increase 
          __________  100% decrease     __________ 100% increase 
                                                                   __________>100% increase 
 
 
8. Suppose that patent protection were not available on GM.  Give the 
percentage by which your company's profits from the products currently 
protected by your GM patents would change. 
 
          __________ 0%                        
          __________  25% reduction       __________ 25% increase 
          __________  50% reduction       __________ 50% increase 
          __________  75% reduction       __________ 75% increase 
          __________  100% reduction     __________ 100% increase 
                                                                   __________>100% increase 
 
 
9. By what percentage do these patents increase the imitation cost of other 
companies? 
 
           ________   0%  (patents are irrelevant to imitation cost) 
            _________ 25% 
            _________ 50% 
            _________ 75% 
            _________ 100% 
            _________ >100% (but not prohibitively expensive) 
            _________ imitation prohibitively expensive 
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10. By what percentage do these patents increase the imitation time of other 
companies? 
 
           ________   0%  (patents are irrelevant to imitation cost) 
            _________ 25% 
            _________ 50% 
            _________ 75% 
            _________ 100% 
            _________ >100% (but not prohibitively expensive) 
            _________ imitation prohibitively expensive 
 
 
11. On average, how many years do you anticipate it will take for your firm to 
recoup its investment in these technologies?  (fractions of years can be 
used, if necessary).  If your firm has already broken even, please report 
the actual time to break even. 
 
 
12. Think about the total cost of patenting for each of the listed patents.  On 
average, what percentage of that cost is due to each of the following:  
(please write a percentage next to each of the following items) 
 
a. obtaining and retaining the patent grant (including the cost of drafting 
the patent application, patent office fees, renewal fees, and other legal 
fees)? 
b. enforcing the patent against infringers? 
c. defending the patent against invalidity challenges or other suits? 
d. Research and development costs? 
 
 
 
13. If the cost of patent enforcement and defence of these patents against 
actions by others were to rise by 10%, what would be the percentage 
change in your R&D expenditure?   
__________ 0%                        
          __________  25% reduction       __________ 25% increase 
          __________  50% reduction       __________ 50% increase 
          __________  75% reduction       __________ 75% increase 
          __________  100% reduction     __________ 100% increase 
                                                          __________>100% increase 
 
 
14. Would a change in the cost of enforcement induce you to do more 
(circle as appropriate): 
 
licensing out? (yes/no)                 licensing in?  (yes/no) 
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15. When an enforcement issues arises regarding a patent, rank the 
following strategies in order of their importance in avoiding litigation 
(write number, with "1" being the most important, next to each item) 
 
• Cross licensing 
• Licensing (either licensing out one of your patents or licensing in a 
patent of the other party) 
• Other (please specify)____________________________________ 
 
 
16. Of the patents that you license out, what percentage is licensed for: 
 
____% up-front payment only  
____% royalty only 
____% royalty and up-front payment 
____% other fee structure (please specify) 
 
 
17. Of the patents that you license out, what percentage is licensed 
exclusively?           ____________% 
 
 
18. If you have licensed any of these patents, what percentage of the total 
profits (including any spillover profits for your other products) of the 
innovation have you attempted to recover through the licensing fee 
structure? 
 
            _________   0% 
            _________ 25% 
            _________ 50% 
            _________ 75% 
            _________ 100% 
 
 
19. Which of these patents has been subject to regulatory procedures 
(such as health and safety approval) beyond patenting?  Please write 
the patent numbers below:  
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Please draw a diagram of the regulatory procedure(s) or describe these 
procedures in words in the space below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
20. If your patent(s) have been subject to regulatory procedures beyond 
patenting, by what percent have the direct costs of procedures 
reduced the profits due to the patent(s), on average? 
 
            ________   0%  
            _________ 25% 
            _________ 50% 
            _________ 75% 
            _________ 100% 
 
 
21. What was the average increase in time to market for your patented 
product due to:  
 
a. the patent process? __________    days/months/years (cross out as 
relevant) 
b. other regulatory procedures?  _________  days/months/years 
(cross out as relevant) 
 
 
22. By what percentage did the cost of obtaining regulatory approval fall 
after using the approval procedure once?  ______  twice? _____ 
 
 
23. If the cost of regulatory approval (beyond patenting) were to rise by 
10% for these patents, what would be the percentage change in your 
licensing activity?   
 
__________% change licensing in     ___________% change licensing out 
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24. Consider the products that you produce with these patents. On 
average, if you were to increase the price of those products by 10%, 
what percentage (measured in units) of your sales would you lose? 
 
            ________   0%  
            _________ 25% 
            _________ 50% 
            _________ 75% 
            _________ 100% 
 
 
25. If your patents benefit purchasers by reducing their costs, on average, 
by what percentage do their costs fall (gross of any royalties) as a 
result of your innovation(s)? 
 
            _________   0%  
            _________ 25% 
            _________ 50% 
            _________ 75% 
            _________ 100% 
 
 
26. How many firms do you view as important product market competitors 
for products based on these patents?  (write a number in the space 
below) 
 
 
If possible, give the names of those competitors you view as important: 
 
 
 
 
27. How many firms do you view as important competitors in research and  
     development in the field of the patents listed above? (write a number in  
     the space below) 
 
 
     If possible, give the names of those competitors you view as important: 
 
 
 
28. Would you classify your firm as still active in the research area of these  
     patents? 
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Appendix B: Patent Database Methodology 
 
• We used the US and European patent office databases to identify any private or 
public entity that held a patent that could be used in the area of GM food up to and 
including year 2000.  We then assembled a database with contact information on 
each of these entities.  Each entity was contacted by telephone or by email, and a 
person who would be capable of answering the survey (and willing to participate) 
was identified.  If the questions in the survey were best completed by more than 
one individual, for example the patent portion might best be completed by an 
intellectual property lawyer from the legal department whereas the research 
questions might best be fielded by a person in the research department, this was 
allowed.  If the entity agreed to participate in the survey, a survey was sent either 
by email or by the post.  After receipt of the survey, the person who had agreed to 
fill it out was re-contacted (sometimes several times) in order to remind him or her 
to fill out the survey, supply duplicate copies in case the survey was misplaced 
and otherwise support the person who was completing the survey.  The research 
assistant for the project performed all the contact, mailing, encoding and follow-
up activities. 
 
• The survey consisted of two parts.  One part elicited general information about the 
organisation, including ownership information, headquarter information, size and 
so on.  The second part was a series of twenty-eight detailed questions regarding 
the strategy undertaken by the organisation in generating and managing the 
intellectual property resulting from the GM research.  The questions included a 
section asking about the effect of GM regulation on the research conducted by the 
organisation.  Questions aimed at obtaining both qualitative and quantitative 
information.   
 
• The data in the surveys has been encoded in an Excel spreadsheet.   
